Self-centered reflection increased sense of agency; selfless reflection decreased it

A pilot experiment linked reflection style to agency and distinct EEG complexity patterns.

In [Self-reflection, sense of agency, and underlying neural correlates: A pilot study], self-centered self-reflection increased an implicit measure of sense of agency, while selfless reflection reduced it. The researchers measured agency using intentional time binding, a timing-based method for assessing how people perceive the link between actions and outcomes. They also found different EEG signatures across reflection types, with more topological complexity during selfless reflection and a negative link between one EEG entropy measure and time binding.

Quick summary

What the study found: Self-centered reflection enhanced intentional time binding (higher implicit agency), while selfless reflection reduced it; EEG patterns differed between reflection types, and higher second-order Hodge spectral entropy was linked to lower time binding.
Why it matters: How you reflect on yourself may shift the felt connection between “I acted” and “I caused that outcome,” which has implications for motivation, self-regulation, and mental health interventions.
What to be careful about: This was a pilot study using an implicit lab measure of agency; it does not establish how these reflection styles affect real-world responsibility, decision-making, or long-term wellbeing.

What was found

The research paper focused on the sense of agency: the feeling that you control your actions and can influence what happens next. The authors tested whether self-reflection—described as a strategy for modulating one’s cognitive state—directly changes an implicit measure of agency, something the abstract says is largely unexplored.

Using a between-subjects experimental design, they compared two types of self-reflection: self-centered reflection and selfless reflection. Agency was measured with intentional time binding experiments, which assess how people perceive sequences of events over time. In this framework, stronger time binding is treated as stronger implicit agency.

The result was directional and clear: self-centered reflection enhanced time binding and agency, while selfless reflection had the opposite effect. In parallel, neural activity during self-reflection showed distinct patterns for each type. Traditional spectral density measures and topological data analysis both differentiated the reflection conditions.

The topological findings leaned heavily toward complexity during selfless reflection. Specifically, selfless reflection showed increased Hodge spectral entropy and persistent entropy compared with self-centered and control groups, interpreted as greater topological complexity in EEG time series. The abstract also reports a significant negative correlation between second-order Hodge spectral entropy and the time binding effect: as that entropy increased, time binding decreased.

What it means

At a psychological level, the core implication is that “how you think about yourself” can shift the brain-and-behavior machinery that supports feeling like an agent. In this study, a self-centered mode of reflection strengthened the implicit coupling between action and outcome in time, while a selfless mode loosened it. That matters because sense of agency is not just a philosophical idea; it helps organize everyday motivation and persistence—people tend to invest effort when they feel their actions reliably produce effects.

The time-binding result also matters because it’s not simply self-report. Intentional binding is an implicit measure: it uses perception of timing to infer the tightness of the action–outcome link. When binding increases, the subjective distance between an action and its outcome typically feels smaller, consistent with a stronger sense of agency. When binding decreases, actions and outcomes feel less tightly connected.

The EEG results add a second layer: reflection styles were not just “different thoughts,” they were associated with distinguishable neural patterns. The topological measures in particular suggest that selfless reflection produced EEG signals with greater complexity. The negative correlation between second-order Hodge spectral entropy and time binding implies that, at least in this dataset, a more topologically complex EEG pattern tracked with weaker implicit agency.

Importantly, none of this says selfless reflection is “bad.” It says selfless reflection, as operationalized here, was linked to a reduced implicit agency signal and higher EEG complexity. In real life, there are many reasons you might want less self-focus or a less tightly gripped sense of control (for example, in practices aimed at reducing rumination). The point is functional: reflection style appears capable of shifting the dial on agency-related processing.

Where it fits

This study sits at the intersection of self-regulation and cognitive neuroscience. Self-reflection is commonly used to adjust emotions, goals, and behavior. Sense of agency is a foundational ingredient in self-regulation because it supports the belief—often nonverbal and automatic—that “my actions matter here.” The abstract positions self-reflection as a tool for modulating cognitive state, then asks whether it reaches down into implicit agency mechanisms.

In broad psychological terms (as background, not a claim about this study), self-focused attention can increase monitoring of intentions, choices, and outcomes. That monitoring can strengthen the subjective experience of authorship over actions. Meanwhile, practices that reduce self-focus—depending on how they are framed and executed—can reduce the salience of the self as the “doer,” which might plausibly reduce agency feelings in some contexts even if they improve calm or perspective in others.

On the neuroscience side, the paper’s use of topological data analysis is a signal of where parts of the field are going: beyond simple power in frequency bands and toward structure in the data. The authors report that topological EEG features may serve as potential neural markers of sense of agency modulated by self-reflection. If that line of work holds up, it could complement behavioral measures by providing a physiological readout that tracks agency shifts across mental states.

How to use it

If you’re a clinician, coach, educator, or manager, the practical takeaway is not “make everyone self-centered.” It’s to recognize that different reflection prompts may push people toward different agency states. When the goal is to increase follow-through—starting a task, persisting through discomfort, or re-engaging after a setback—reflection that highlights the person as an active causal agent may be useful.

Concrete examples of self-centered reflection prompts (general examples, not from the study) include: “What did I choose to do, and what happened next?” “Which part of this outcome was influenced by my actions?” “What is one action I can take that would change tomorrow?” These prompts emphasize authorship and contingency: action leads to effect.

Selfless reflection prompts might emphasize decentering from the self, such as: “Notice thoughts as events passing through awareness,” or “Consider the broader system and how outcomes emerge from many causes.” This style may be valuable for reducing self-blame or loosening rigid control, but this study’s findings suggest it could also weaken implicit agency in the moment. If someone already feels powerless or disengaged, that tradeoff matters.

A useful application is sequencing. In performance contexts, you might start with selfless reflection to reduce threat and emotional reactivity, then shift to self-centered reflection to restore agency and action planning. In therapy contexts, the same sequencing could help when clients are stuck between hyper-responsibility (too much agency, too much blame) and helplessness (too little agency, too little ownership). The clinical art is choosing which state is needed now.

Limits & what we still don’t know

The abstract describes this as a pilot study, which signals early-stage evidence. The design was between-subjects, but the abstract does not provide sample details, manipulation specifics, or how long effects lasted. So we cannot infer durability, clinical impact, or whether certain people respond differently.

We also don’t know how “self-centered” and “selfless” reflection were induced or how cleanly those states were separated in participants’ minds. Real-world self-reflection is messy: people can be self-focused and other-focused at once, or shift rapidly between them. It’s also unclear from the abstract whether the control condition involved any reflection at all or a different cognitive activity.

Crucially, intentional time binding is an implicit proxy for agency, not a full picture of agency in daily life. The study does not claim effects on responsibility judgments, moral decision-making, workplace performance, relationships, or symptoms. The EEG findings are correlational with respect to time binding, and the neural patterns were observed during reflection, but the abstract does not establish causal pathways between EEG complexity and agency changes.

Finally, the topological metrics are promising but still technical. The abstract suggests these features could be potential neural markers, not that they are ready for diagnosis, monitoring, or consumer neurofeedback. Replication, robustness checks, and practical interpretability are the next hurdles.

Closing takeaway

This study’s headline result is straightforward: self-centered reflection increased an implicit measure of sense of agency, and selfless reflection decreased it. The EEG data suggest these reflection styles also map onto distinct neural patterns, with greater topological complexity during selfless reflection and a negative association between one entropy measure and time binding. If you’re designing reflection exercises—whether for therapy, training, or personal change—treat reflection style as a lever that can shift agency up or down, then use that lever deliberately.

Data in this article is provided by PLOS.

Tagged Bioassays and physiological analysis, Brain electrophysiology, Brain mapping, Classical mechanics, Clinical medicine, Clinical neurophysiology, Cognition, Cognitive psychology, Cognitive science, Electroencephalography, Electrophysiological techniques, Electrophysiology, Emotions, Entropy, Imaging techniques, Learning and memory, Memory, Memory recall, Neuroimaging, Neurophysiology, Neuroscience, Perception, Physics, Reflection, Sense of agency, Sensory perception, Signal filtering, Signal processing, Social cognition, Social psychology, Thermodynamics